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that the basic purpose behind the rule against perpetuities is violated. Since the
lessor has no way of setting aside the lease, this would result in placing a cloud
upon the lessor's title. Such a result would be contrary to the alienability of a clear
title and therefore violative of the basic purpose of the rule.15 The effect of the rule,
and its operation, is to declare as void the lessee's interest and thereby restore the
power of alienation to the lessor.' 6 This cloud would not arise in the trust case as
the power to convey clear title is always there. This fact may well be the reason
why the possibility that the interested party's rights would not be exercised didn't
receive attention.
The technical violation of the rule, as mentioned earlier, is not necessarily con-
trolling nor is the lack of remedy in the lessor an insurmountable obstacle in light
of present reflection. To hold that the parties to this lease would have allowed this
contractual arrangement to remain executory after the expiration of 21 years is
"fantastic" and still more so if it would be found that the lessee would have an
enforceable right, not barred by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches,
at such time. It would seem therefore that the status of the lessor would be substan-
tially the same as it would have been had the lease contained a specific date for
performance and the lessor had not performed. The relation as between the lessor
and the lessee is such as to render the lessor's title as to a third party sufficiently
alienable so as not to offend the purpose behind the rule.
There appears to be no practical difference between an inherent limitation of a
reasonable time for performance of a lease, which in a particular contract may be
construed by the courts to be less than 21 years, and a specific limitation which is
less than 21 years. In either case, the contract fails within the period allowed by the
rule. The court, in each case of this nature, must determine, by reference to the
terms of the contract and intent of the parties, whether a reasonable time could or
could not extend beyond a period of 21 years. To hold in the present case that
there is a "bare possibility" of the lease, by its terms, remaining contingent after




EVIDENCE: STANDING TO OBJECT TO AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH OF THE PERSON
As the scene opens, the defendant is talking in whispered tones to a friend at
one end of a bar. Presently he moves to the other end of the bar and engages in
whispered conversation with another friend. When he walks to the check stand
near the exit to get his coat, he is arrested by the police on a charge of unlawful
possession of narcotics. At his side is a sack which the officer claims he observed
him carrying. The defendant denies any ownership or possession of the sack or
the narcotics which are found therein by the officer.
At the trial for unlawful possession of narcotics, the defendant defends on two
grounds. First, he denies possession, putting the prosecution to a proof of the sub-
stantive offense. Second, he claims that if possession of the narcotics is proved
against him, the evidence of it should be suppressed because it is the result of
15 See Fraser, The Rationale of the Rue Against Perpetuities, 6 MnN. L. Rlv. 560, 561
(1922).
16 Ibid.
17 161 Cal. App. 2d._, 326 P.2d 957, 968 (1958).
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an unlawful search and seizure.' The prosecution asserts that the defendant must
claim possession of the narcotics in order to have standing to object to the unlawful
search and seizure in the federal courts. Thus, even if the defendant's arrest and
subsequent search were unlawful, he would have two major difficulties in the pro-
posed line of defense. The first difficulty is the property interest required to be
asserted in order to raise the issue of unreasonable search and seizure. The second
difficulty is the necessity of making a timely motion for suppression of the evidence,
which under federal rules2 generally must be a pre-trial motion. These problems
indirectly arose in the recent federal case of Christensen v. United States.3
The general rule is that "objection to evidence obtained in violation of..
[the fourth] amendment may be raised only by one who claims ownership in or
right to possession of the premises searched or the property seized, ... " 4 If this
rule were applied to the present case, it would place the defendant in a dilemma.
The price of his claiming the privilege against unreasonable search and seizure
is a withdrawing of his guarantee in the fifth amendment against self-incrimina-
tion. 5 This is so because the claiming of possession would be tantamount to a con-
fession of guilt on a criminal charge.
Many of the federal courts seem little concerned about this dilemma. On the
contrary the second circuit, speaking through Judge Learned Hand, would require
an unequivocal admission of possession, for as he said in Connolly v. Medalie:6
Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners, or in possession, of contra-
band property; may wish at once to secure the remedies of a possessor, and avoid
the perils of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they come as victims they
must take on that role, with enough detail to cast them without question. The peti-
tioners at bar shrank from that predicament; but they were obliged to choose one
horn of the dilemma.
Thus even those who would force the choice admit the dilemma.7 In the present
case if the defendant does not claim possession of the seized contraband, we allow
it to be used in evidence against him. If he does claim possession of the contraband,
we let his own claim convict him.8 Such a choice should not be forced in the absence
of clear necessity.
Evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure by federal officers is not ad-
missible in the federal courts.9 The principal theory behind this rule of exclusion
is that it is against public policy to admit evidence obtained in violation of the
basic constitutional right of persons to be secure against unreasonable search and
seizure.10 judge Learned Hand states that a rule excluding the evidence is the only
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "[Tlhe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizure, shall not be violated."
2 FED. R. CR b. P. 41 (e).
3 259 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
4 Gibson v. United States, 149 F.2d 381, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
6 U.S. CoNsr. amend. V: "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. .. "
6 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932).
7 That the imposition of such a view is unconstitutional see Edwards, Standing to Suppress
Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 471, 478 (1952).
8 On admissibility in evidence of such claims see notes 25 and 29 infra.
9 E.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); McCoazmcx, EVIDENCE § 139 (1940). Cases, including
state cases following the federal rule, are collected in annot., 50 A.L.R. 2d 531 (1956).
10 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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practical way of enforcing this constitutional privilege." According to the United
States Supreme Court this interest in privacy guaranteed by the fourth amend-
ment is greater than the opposing interest in punishing those guilty of crime by
means of evidence that is the fruit of the invasion of privacy.' 2 They therefore pre-
sumably accept a balancing of policies in favor of individual constitutional rights.
However, the lower federal courts have developed stringent requirements for
asserting the application of the rule in order to limit its operation. Foremost among
these requirements is the standing necessary to object to an unreasonable search
and seizure.13 For asserting constitutional rights or contesting the validity of gov-
ernmental action, the Supreme Court has imposed the requirement that the claim-
ant have a certain basic litigable interest.14 This concept of a "justiciable contro-
versy" is a self-imposed limitation on the application of the court's jurisdiction.
The court asserts jurisdiction only when necessary to protect rights of a particular
person, since the right to object is personal.' 5
In applying the rule of standing to cases of unlawful search and seizure, the
courts have been neither consistent nor clear. All courts do, however, seem to agree
on the basic premise that "one not a victim of an unlawful search and seizure can-
not object to the introduction of evidence obtained from an unlawful search and
seizure." "I
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely settled this question,' 7 stand-
ing is generally denied in cases of searches of property where the person complain-
ing claimed no right in either the premises searched or the property seized.' 8 How-
ever, on at least one occasion, the eighth circuit indicated that the claimant must
show ownership of both the premises searched and the property seized.19
In addition to the above inconsistencies the courts are not altogether uniform
as to whether the requirement is for ownership or possession. Generally, the courts
at least give lip service to ownership either as a requirement or as sufficient to ful-
fill the requirement, but the actual test usually seems to be possession.20 One might
11 United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1945).
12 See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) ; McCo.asc, EVIDENCE § 138, at
293-94 (1954).
13 Grant, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 So. CAL. L. REv. 359, 368 (1941);
Comment, 55 Micn. L. Rv. 567, 569 (1957).
14 F.CA. Const. Art. III, § II, CI. I at 306-08.
15 See Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
16Id. at 121.
17 See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) ; Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S.
114 (1942).
18 E.g., Gaskins v. United States, 218 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (search of an apartment,
the defendant being a nonresident guest); Washington v. United States, 202 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir.
1953); Gibson v. United States, 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Williams v. United States,
66 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1933) (search of an automobile) ; Belcher v. United States, 50 F.2d 573
(8th Cir. 1931); Shore v. United States, 49 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (a defendant who did
not claim property in trunks searched or property seized) ; Hogg v. United States, 35 F.2d 954
(5th Cir. 1929) (search of a car and seizure of whisky therefrom) ; Klein v. United States, 14
F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1926) (seizure of liquor in an apartment not occupied by defendant).
9Occinto v. United States, 54 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1931). See also Wrightson v. United
States, 222 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (defendant claiming ownership of suitcases but not their
contents was denied standing) ; Hurwitz v. United States, 299 F. 449 (8th Cir. 1924), cert.
denied, 226 U.S. 613 (1924) (defendant's rights not invaded by seizure from defendant's car
of drugs belonging to third party.
2 Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. UL. REv. 471,
485 (1952). See also annot., 96 L.Ed. 66, 70 (1952).
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think at first blush that either would be sufficient to make one a "victim" of an
unlawful search and seizure but the courts have not so held. Thus the courts have
often required more than the "basic litigable interest" required to assert other
constitutional rights.
21
The cases dealing with searches of premises can be rationalized (except for the
distinctions between ownership and possession) on the theory that a person's
privacy is not invaded with relation to someone else's premises unless further facts
appear. It seems that the only logic in requiring an interest in the premises when
there is a search thereof is to show a violation of some right which we might call
"security of premises." The logical requirement when dealing with searches of
persons is to require a violation of "security of person."
Viewing the cases on standing, it is difficult to tell just what the requirements
for standing are. The real reason for development of these requirements of stand-
ing seems to be a disposition to limit the application of the federal rule requiring
exclusion of such evidence. It is partly a question of policy-how far to protect
the individual's privacy at the expense of more difficult law enforcement. In addi-
tion it is also a question of constitutional construction-of how far the constitution
requires such protection. However, as mentioned earlier, the United States Su-
preme Court, having adopted the exclusionary rule as the only practical means of
making the fourth amendment presently meaningful, presumably recognizes a
great interest in privacy. At any rate, it would seem that the courts should come
to grips with the real heart of the problem on standing and recognize it for what it
is; a question either of policy or of constitutional rights and not merely a question
of procedural standing. The tests of standing, as stringently and inconsistently
applied, seem only to be a judicial facade. It is desirable that the courts recognize
this and simply determine in each case whether any rights of the person have
been violated. If they have, then the violation of those rights ought to give one
standing to object.
Applying this approach to the factual situation of the principal case, we see
that the real problem is one of proving a violation of security of the person if the
defendant does not claim that anything was taken from his person. It is undoubt-
edly true that a person's privacy is violated by a search of his person, irrespective
of whether any property was seized from him. However, our present problem goes
deeper and deals not just with searches but with evidence obtained from a seizure.
Thus the question becomes: How can the defendant claim that some evidence
(contraband goods), whose introduction is anticipated, was obtained through a
violation of his person unless he claims the evidence was on his person? The pro-
cedural rule requiring standing or ownership of the property seized is meaningful
only in the context of determining whether there was in fact an unlawful seizure.
To treat it as merely a rule of procedure is to confuse the substance of the
problem.
The courts have also applied a purely procedural rule which aggravates the
dilemma posed to such a person as the defendant in the present case. According
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 41 (e), which codifies preexisting
law, a motion must be made before the trial by the "person aggrieved" if he
wishes the return of something illegally seized or the suppression of evidence ob-
21 See note 19 supra. See also 96 L.Ed. 66 (1952).
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taned by illegal search and seizure. This procedure is adopted so that the trial
will not have to deviate from the main issue.22 Accordingly some courts have held
that a defendant with full knowledge of the grounds for the motion who fails to
make the motion before the trial waives his opportunity to assert his constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure at the trial. 23 Where, however, an
opportunity is lacking or the defendant was unaware of the grounds for the
motion, the trial court must allow the motion at the trial. Where he has no such
knowledge, Agnello v. United States2 4 held that the admissions can be avoided
where the prosecution has shown by its own proof an unlawful search and seizure.
The defendant can then have the evidence excluded.
The Agnello case involved a search of the defendant's house. In the present
case the search is of a person so that it cannot easily be maintained that the defend-
ant was unaware of the search and seizure if one in fact has occurred. Therefore
the question arises: Does the defendant, having full information on which to base
his pre-trial motion, waive his right to object if he does not assert it before the
trial? The answer to this question depends on interpreting the Agnello case and
the law surrounding rule 41 (e). In Agnello the court states that the reason or pur-
pose for rule 41 (e) is to prevent the trial court from having to pause to determine
collateral issues of how evidence was obtained. It is to prevent the delay and
attendant confusion resulting from attacks during a trial on admissibility of illeg-
ally seized evidence. If this is the real basis of the Agnello case rather than the lack
of knowledge by Agnello of the search, then the defendant in the present case
could avoid the dilemma by failure to make a pre-trial motion and then moving
for exclusion at the trial after the prosecution has by its own evidence proved the
unlawful search and seizure. This would avoid the admission of possession of the
drugs.
However, if the defendant does not wish to gamble on the possibility that the
prosecution will prove an unlawful search and seizure, he must make a pre-trial
motion. To show standing he must admit possession or ownership, an admission
which may prove an element of the very crime charged.
The federal courts generally hold that admissions appearing in the allegations
of the motion to suppress and the affidavits in support thereof are admissible as
evidence in a subsequent trial against the defendant, at least where the motion
has been properly overruled on the ground that the search was legal.2 5 Also testi-
mony given by a defendant at a hearing on his motion to suppress evidence has
been admitted in evidence against him at his prosecution over the objection that it
was not voluntary. Thus in Kaiser v. United States20 the court said, "[WJ e are at
a loss to understand just what the compulsion was. The statement was voluntarily
made.... The government did not compel him to make the statement." 27 Thus the
court felt that there was no compulsory self-incriminaiton.
In one case, where the motion has been overruled and the affidavits of admis-
sion had been used against the defendant, the court drew no distinction between
22 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
23 Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106 (1927).
24 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
2 Fowler v. United States, 239 F.2d 93 (loth Cir. 1956) ; Kaiser v. United States, 60 F.2d
410 (8th Cir. 1932) ; Heller v. United States, 57 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1932).
2
660 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1932).
27 id. at 413.
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situations where the motion was sustained and where it was overruled.28 This of
course would make it possible for the government always to benefit by an illegal
search. If the thing or evidence itself is not suppressed because sufficient interest
is not alleged to give standing to object, then of course the evidence is used. If it is
suppressed, then the defendant's claim of possession can be used. The Supreme
Court has not yet decided this question of admissibility.
The eighth circuit has held that where the motion for suppression has been
sustained, then neither the motion nor the supporting testimony are admissible
against the defendant at the trial.2 9 The court pointed out that the admission of
such evidence would violate the guarantees against both unreasonable search and
seizure and self-incrimination. ° The decision was rested partly on the theory
that such admission resulted from or were the "fruits" of the unlawful search and
seizure and that the government is forbidden to take advantage of such admis-
sions.31 It would be allowing them to do indirectly what they could not do directly.
The eighth circuit case presents a partial solution to the dilemma of such a
defendant. However, to give full and adequate protection to one's right to object
to an unlawful search and seizure, it is necessary to extend the rule to cases where
the motion has been previously overruled. The reason for this necessity is that
sometimes a person is subjected to an unlawful search and seizure but is not posi-
tive he can prove it. In such a situation, he will not dare to make a pre-trial motion
to suppress evidence if the admissions made in the motion can be used against him
should the motion be overruled. The burden of proof is on the defendant to show
an unlawful search and seizure. If we use the admissions against him for failure to
meet that burden, it would greatly limit the scope of the fourth amendment.
If the police can search persons indiscriminately and use the evidence so ob-
tained because no one can object without convicting himself, it would be a travesty
on the rights of the individual protected by the Constitution.
The precise question of standing where a person has been unreasonably
searched being an open one, the writer concludes that fairness, logic and the Con-
stitution require that such a person not be placed in this dilemma of having to
incriminate himself.
William L. Caraway
2 Heller v. United States, 57 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1932).
29 Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933).
3 0 Id. at 898.
31 Ibid.
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